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Abstract
This survey focuses on intrusion detection systems (IDS) that leverage host-based data sources
for detecting attacks on enterprise network. The host-based IDS (HIDS) literature is organized
by the input data source, presenting targeted sub-surveys of HIDS research leveraging system
logs, audit data, Windows Registry, file systems, and program analysis. While system calls are
generally included in audit data, several publicly available system call datasets have spawned a
flurry of IDS research on this topic, which merits a separate section. Similarly, a section surveying
algorithmic developments that are applicable to HIDS but tested on network data sets is included,
as this is a large and growing area of applicable literature. To accommodate current researchers, a
supplementary section giving descriptions of publicly available datasets is included, outlining their
characteristics and shortcomings when used for IDS evaluation. Related surveys are organized and
described. All sections are accompanied by tables concisely organizing the literature and datasets
discussed. Finally, challenges, trends, and broader observations are throughout the survey and in
the conclusion along with future directions of IDS research.
This manuscript has been authored by UT-Battelle, LLC, under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725
with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The US government retains and the publisher, by
accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the US government retains a nonexclu-
sive, paid-up, irrevocable, worldwide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this
manuscript, or allow others to do so, for US government purposes. DOE will provide public ac-
cess to these results of federally sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan
(http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-public-access-plan).
1 Introduction
Intrusion detection research began in 1972, when James Anderson published a United States Air Force
report discussing the need to detect security breaches of computing systems [7]. Manual investigations
of logs and audit data were widely adopted by computer security operators (or system administrators)
in the early age of IT technology, yet IDSs that fully depended on experienced security experts could
not meet the new requirements of the developing computing technology. In response, automated
IDS research emerged—Anderson’s 1980 work [8] focused on automating IDS by isolating abnormal
behavior in system’s audit data, and work of Denning and Neumann [34] developed the first real-time
detection system based on expert-written rules in 1985. This early research laid the groundwork for
modern intrusion detection, comprised of manual techniques, algorithms, and commercial products all
geared towards one thing, continual monitoring of computing assets for signs of compromise. [17, 85]
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Increasingly over the last 30 years, networked computing systems have emerged as ubiquitous as-
sets on which state, personal, and industrial infrastructure critically depend. Moreover, the threat
of cyber security breaches has risen, with adversaries now fueled by a profitable underground cyber-
crime economy and nation-state ambitions [3, 151]. Consequently, breaches ranging from personal
computers to large enterprises and governmental networks are now commonly reported, and govern-
mental assistance, in terms of IDS tutorials, guidelines, and case studies have resulted [145]. Through
the authors’ ongoing collaborations with multiple security operations, we note that many operations
now have widespread collection and query capabilities for logs and alerts. Yet, detection in practice
has focused on signature and rule-based detection, often at the network or file levels, complemented
by manual analysis of logs. [20, 15] These rule-based IDSs are accurate for detecting known system
cyber attacks but cannot identify unknown, novel, or polymorphic cyber threats. In addition, their
computational overheads (i.e., time, CPU, and memory costs) are usually high. This has motivated
parallel developments in the research literature for a wide variety of automated, fast, and efficient
IDSs. From expert-crafted rules to sophisticated statistical learning algorithms, publications explore
and push detection accuracy metrics and performance on a variety of data sources and locations within
the network (see Sections 3-8 below).
1.1 IDS Components, Types, and Challenges
In general, all intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have three main components.
• Data collection: They ingest one or many data types e.g., system calls or network flows.
• Conversion to select features: Some predefined unit of data, e.g., system calls in a process or
flows in a time window, is represented as a list of attributes, called a feature vector.
• Decision engine: An algorithm or heuristic to decide if the given data, as represented as a feature
vector, is believed to be an attack or not.
Common research for IDS development involves testing supervised classifiers and unsupervised anomaly
or one-class detectors as the decision engine algorithm. The decision engine can then be configured
to inform a user or some automated response system.
The decision engine can be categorized as misuse, anomaly or a hybrid detector. Misuse intrusion
detection uses predefined attack patterns, e.g., signatures of known malware or expert-crafted rules,
to flag matching events. Consequently, zero-day attacks, i.e., novel attacks or attacks exploiting
previously unknown vulnerabilities, generally bypass misused detection algorithms. Misuse detection
systems dominate IDS use in practice, as they have been the main focus of commercially-driven
detection products. Host-based anti-virus such as McAfee1 and Kasperski2, and network-level rule-
based systems such as Snort3 are examples of very popular misuse detection systems. Generally, the
first line of defense, misuse detection relies on an database of attack signatures, which is generally
large, constantly growing, can be cumbersome to use efficiently and necessitates regular updates. On
the other hand, misuse detection generally realizes a relatively low number of false positives, but a
high number of false negatives.
In anomaly detection, a description of normal or expected behavior is learned from observations
and a sufficient deviation from this normal profile is flagged as a potential attack; thus, the detection
of never-before-seen attack patterns is possible. Anomaly detection systems that update in near real
time can evolve models with the slowly changing system [42, 61]. The primary downside of anomaly
detection is detection accuracy, most notably, that these techniques suffer from higher quantities of
false alarms. Moreover, attacks can hide in the noise floor of ambient data if training data (from
1 See www.mcafee.com.
2 See www.kaspersky.com.
3 See www.snort.com.
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which normal behavior is learned) exhibits large variance. Similarly, if attacks are present in training
data, detectors will potentially be trained to regard such behavior as normal [150].
Hybrid systems are also often studied; these take into account previous knowledge but seek to
generalize to unseen data. For example, systems are proposed that seek to complement misuse de-
tection with anomaly detection, using them in tandem [166]. When datasets with labeled intrusions
are available, research will often experiment with combinations of feature selection and supervised
learning algorithms. Supervised learning classifiers are generally less rigid than traditional misuse
detection systems, as they are trained to generalize previously seen attack and non-attack examples.
Supervised learners can often classify anomalies as attacks.
Feature selection is influential on both accuracy and performance of IDSs classifiers. In many
applications, the number of features can grow to enormous quantities, but as feature vectors gain length
so does the computational complexity, quantity of training data, and time needed for both training and
inference. Additionally, poor features both decrease performance and add noise, reducing accuracy of
the classifier while contributing to expense. To combat these factors, methods of dimension reduction
seek to identify redundancy and find correlations in features, thereby reducing the number of features
without losing information. This careful choice of features is the focus of many detection efforts. Where
progressions of research built on the same datasets exist (e.g., see Sections 4 and 8), research generally
trends from using raw data as features, to considering cost-to-accuracy benefits of various hand-crafted
features, to data-driven techniques for dimension reduction and feature selection/creation.
Biased classes, in our case where non-attack data is in far more abundance than attack data, are
a perennial problem for classifiers and a looming issue in the intersection of machine learning and
intrusion detection. Much research seeks to use hybrid methods, ensembles, and advanced feature
selection algorithms to circumvent the problem.
While incomplete training data (in particular, not having representative attack data available)
is an issue for misuse supervised detectors, noisy training data is a common problem especially for
anomaly detectors, which often characterize normal data from a history of the data. Most notably,
if unknown attacks exist in training data, the detector may regard similar future attacks as normal.
Robust statistical methods have been used to discard outliers when fitting anomaly detection models,
which can help address these problems. As our survey is organized by data source, unique approaches
to these challenges are pointed out in the sections in which they occur.
1.2 IDS Location
An IDS is most often categorized based on the information source utilized by the IDS and its position
within the network architecture. Since an IDS’s capabilities depend largely on what data it has
available [119], location is a critical architectural decision. This can be viewed most coarsly as network-
based IDS (NIDS) versus host-based IDS (HIDS). Host-based IDSs are generally a software component
located on the system being monitored, and typically monitor a single system. This gives HIDS
excellent visibility into the system state, but poor isolation from the system, meaning that an attacker
with access to the system can either mislead or disable the HIDS. Additionally, host-based data is
often context-rich, allowing deeper understanding of processes and activities, but comes with added
costs of requiring access to the host, configuration of distributed clients, and often requires collecting
and managing potentially large and sensitive datasets from these hosts. Network IDSs are generally
physically separate devices, located on the network “upstream” of the system being monitored, and
they generally monitor many separate systems on a common network. The NIDS is often completely
transparent to the systems being monitored, which provides good isolation and makes NIDSs much less
susceptible to any interference from an attacker. However, these systems have little or no information
available about the internal state of the systems they are monitoring, which can make detection more
difficult.
Hybrid and distributed IDSs (DIDS) combine information from multiple sources into one system.
Hybrid IDSs combine both host-based and network-based data, generally with the goal of achieving
more complete visibility of a host. Distributed IDSs combine data from multiple sensor locations into
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a combined decision-making or combined alerting process; this may use information from host-based
sensors, network-based sensors, or both.
The use of virtualized resources, e.g., cloud computing environments, provide opportunities for
monitoring virtualized hosts from different locations, with trade offs in visibility and capabilities.
For example, traditional IDSs can reside inside the virtualized host, or one can gain isolation from
infections or compromises of the host, at the cost of poorer visibility into the host, by monitoring
host data at the hypervisor-level to perform detection of one or many guest Operating Systems (OSs).
Virtual machine monitor (VMM) IDSs involve monitoring a virtual machine’s (VM) OS (or in some
cases, its applications or services) from a logically external location on the same physical machine.
Several of the above IDS techniques have been utilized within cloud environments. These cloud IDSs
can include network-based data, host-based data, or both, and, while cloud infrastructure relies heavily
on VMs, these systems do not necessarily include the same techniques as VMM IDSs.
Among HIDS, most systems can be categorized as either a program-level or OS-level IDS. Program-
level IDSs focus on monitoring a single application, using information such as source code, byte code,
system calls invoked, static or dynamic control flow, and other information on the application’s state.
Much of this relies significantly on research in related topics, such as vulnerability detection and
malware analysis/detection, but here we focus on works that take these techniques and apply them
to detecting intrusions or anomalies in applications at run-time.
OS-level IDSs monitor the overall system state, and may monitor the combined behavior of all
processes, to distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior at the OS level. This can involve
collecting data from system logs, Windows Registry data, system calls invoked, file system monitoring,
or other sources. System calls have been well utilized for the detection of normal and anomalous
behavior. While sequences of system calls for a single application can be used in a program-level IDS,
these are often combined, by monitoring all system calls of all processes, for use in an OS-level IDS.
System call traces, the sequence of system calls of a given process, are used to find repeated patterns
of system calls, enabling anomaly detection and misuse detection during execution. [93].
Finally, we note that side-channel detection—detectors leveraging physical characteristics such
as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, vibrations, timings—has gained traction in cyber-
physical IDS research [51, 24, 25, 75] but is a growing area of research for traditional computers
using host-level (albeit physical) data [29, 75]. For most of these works, the primary advantage is the
detectors’ physical separation from the host, which prevents software intrusions from tampering with
the detector, and the fact that malicious changes to host necessarily induces physical changes from
normal behavior. These researches are considered out of scope for the current survey.
1.3 Scope & Organization
This survey focuses on HIDSs, and attempts to capture and organize the variety of data sources used,
methods tested, and general trends in the HIDS research. Because of the large volume of work in
this area, we cannot comprehensively cover all relevant works; we prioritize a broad coverage each
host-based data source and its use for intrusion detection, and we discuss research trends over time
for each of these data sources. Algorithmic research that is developed for NIDS, but portable to host
data sources, is isolated and included. While VMM-IDSs and DIDSs leverage host-level data, their
contributions generally focus on new architectures, instead of the analysis itself, and for this reason
they are not included.
Section 2 describes several other IDS surveys. The following sections are sub-surveys of HIDS
research, each for a different input data type. Section 3 focuses on system logs and audit data.
While system calls are considered audit data, a flurry of targeted detection research brought on by
labeled data sets merited their own Section, 4. Section 5 gives, to the best of our knowledge, a
comprehensive description of the few IDS works leveraging Windows Registry data. Section 6 reviews
works leveraging file system monitoring for identifying malicious files, while Section 7 discusses a few
works that leverage information about processes or stored binaries on a host for detection. A large
body of research focuses more on algorithmic development for detection than on specific data source
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applications; in particular, many of these works test the proposed methods on KDD- and DARPA-
related network datasets, but the algorithms are applicable to host-based data sets. Many of these
works are captured in Section 8. Our final section gives conclusions. To assist current research, the
publicly available datasets and databases referenced in the literature for IDS validation are collected
in Supplemental Materials.
All sections are accompanied by one or many tables, itemizing the discussed references and pre-
senting their key characteristics for comparison. By organizing the literature by data source, we hope
that current researchers (1) quickly see the panorama of data sources available for HIDS research, and
(2) for a given data source of interest, elicit progressions in the literature and identify gaps, trends,
or novel directions for future contributions.
2 Related Surveys
Several surveys provide discussions on existing IDS research, and we review the recent, related ones in
this section. Table 1 presents a quick comparison, as it details many discussion topics and attributes
of the surveys.
Table 1: Existing IDS Survey Comparison
Survey IDS Types IDS
Location
Datasets Data
Source
Feature
Selection
This Survey HIDS, NIDS Discussed Discussed Discussed Discussed
Axelsson ‘00 [10] HIDS, NIDS NA NA Discussed Discussed
Patcha & Park ‘07 [130] HIDS, NIDS NA Discussed Discussed Discussed
Kabiri & Ghorbani ‘05
[78]
NIDS NA NA NA Discussed
Lazarevic et al. ‘05 [100] HIDS, NIDS, DIDS NA NA Discussed NA
Sabahi et al. ‘08 [142] HIDS, NIDS Discussed Discussed Discussed NA
Mehmood et al. ‘13 [115] HIDS, NIDS, DIDS,
VMM
Discussed NA Discussed Discussed
Liao et al. ‘13 [105] HIDS, NIDS, DIDS,
VMM
NA NA Discussed NA
Modi et al. ‘13 [119] HIDS, NIDS, DIDS,
VMM
Discussed NA NA NA
Kumar & Gohil ‘15 [98] HIDS, NIDS, DIDS Discussed NA NA NA
Kahn et al. ‘16 [86] HIDS, NIDS Discussed NA NA NA
Chiba et al. ‘16 [23] HIDS, NIDS, DIDS,
VMM
Discussed NA NA NA
Buczak & Guven ‘16 [18] NIDS NA Discussed Discussed NA
Mishra et al. ‘17 [118] VMM Discussed NA NA NA
Axelsson [10] surveys anomaly and misuse papers pre-2000 and organizes the research by sorting
on the proposed problem’s level of difficultly.
Patcha & Park [130] perform an in-depth review of anomaly and hybrid based intrusion detection
papers spanning from 2000-2006. The papers are organized based on the classification algorithm used
and discussed in terms of existing challenges, such as high false alarm rate. Additionally, numerous
open challenges, such as failure to scale to gigabit speeds, are discussed.
Kabiri & Ghorbani [78] primarily focus on NIDS, but discuss the importance of feature selection
with respect to dimension reduction, importance of the features, and their relation to one another in
the feature space, which is neglected as its own topic in other surveys.
Lazarevic et al. [100] extensively cover attack types and categorizes them into classes. A generic
architecture is defined for an IDS. The survey provides an overview on IDS taxomony and discusses
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information sources, including system commands, accounting, and logs as well as security audit pro-
cessing. However, user-level logs, process profiling, file system, registry, raw pages/introspection are
excluded.
Sabahi et al. [142] provide a very brief survey of different IDS systems including HIDS, NIDS,
and DIDS, covering data sources used to conduct detection and detection methods, such as misuse
detection, protocol analysis and anomaly detection. They mention that detection can be conducted
online or offline and provide examples of both centralized and distributed architectures.
Mehmood et al. [115] provide an overview of different intrusions for cloud-based systems and ana-
lyze several existing cloud-based IDSs with respect to their type, positioning, detection time, detection
technique, data source, and attacks detection capabilities. The analysis also provides limitations of
each technique to evaluate whether each fulfills the security requirements of the cloud computing
environment.
Liao et al. [105] present a comprehensive survey of IDSs concentrating on signature-based, behavior-
based, and specification-based methods. These detection methods are further divided into “statistics-
based, pattern-based, rule-based, state-based, and heuristic-based” approaches.
Modi et al. [119] offer recommendations for IDS/IPS placement within cloud environments to reach
common security goals in next-generation networks.
Kumar & Gohil [98] discuss traditional attack types and analysis techniques used for HIDSs,
NIDSs, and DIDSs.
Khan et al. [86] briefly discuss HIDSs and NIDSs, and discuss their architecture and applicability,
as well as highlighting shortcomings, such as the high communication and computational overhead of
some approaches. A parametric comparison of the threats being faced by cloud platforms is performed,
which incorporates a discussion of how various intrusion detection and prevention frameworks can
apply to various common security issues.
Chiba et al. [23] discuss cloud-based IDSs and analyze the systems based on their various types,
positions, detection type, and data source. Strengths and weaknesses are discussed to determine the
IDSs validity in a cloud computing environment.
Buczak and Guven [18] provide a survey of machine learning approaches for IDSs. Their work
provides brief descriptions of important algorithms, including a table with algorithmic time complexity.
This non-comprehensive survey primarily includes examples of NIDS research, with selection criteria
for influential works to include examples of each classification algorithm used for an IDS. Similarly, a
few data sources, e.g. packets, are discussed in detail, along with several open source datasets.
Mishra et al. [118] heavily focus on virtual machine introspection (VMI) and hypervisor intro-
spection (HVI) as IDS techniques, and compares cloud security with network security. Cloud-specific
threats and vulnerabilities are discussed via an attack taxonomy. Challenges are briefly discussed
including availability of data sets, IDS position, performance, and IDS limitations. Parallel program-
ming and the usage of GPUs are mentioned for performance improvement.
This survey provides an in-depth discussion of IDS work that leverages host-based data sources for
attack detection. We organize works based on their data source with the goal of giving the interested
reader a panoramic view of the different avenues for detection. Furthermore, this work provides an
in-depth introduction to available host-level data sources, and discusses and their uses and limitations.
Works that focus on algorithmic development, but are tested on network-level data, are included where
they apply to HIDS. Additionally, a supplementary includes a list of publicly available datasets used
in the research literature for evaluating IDSs, outlining their characteristics and shortfalls.
3 System Log and System Audit Data IDSs
Log files are a collection of system-generated records that detail the sequence of events of a server,
an OS, or an application. The log files are processed or stored for various analyses or forensics. Most
programs and applications generate separate individual log files, associated with activities conducted
by those programs’ processes. As an example, a system log file is usually associated with records
6
produced by the OS, including but not limited to warnings, errors, and system failures. Individual
applications may produce log files associated with user sessions containing login time, authentication
result, user-program interactions, etc. While an OS-produced log file is considered a system log
file, files produced by individual applications or users are considered audit data. Examples include
successful and failed authentication logs, system calls, or user command logs.
Since such data sources document the sequence of events of the system or programs, they are a
promising resource for detecting intrusions, as an HIDS can leverage the data to profile behavior of an
individual user or system. Conversely, the downside to high fidelity audit data is the collection cost.
Below we survey literature leveraging system logs and audit data for intrusion detection. We note
that system calls can be considered a subset of audit data, but because there is a rich progression of
research which considers them independently, system-call-based IDSs merit their own section, Section
4.
3.1 System Logs IDSs
With any IDS, the goal is to perform in a cost-effective, adaptable, intelligent, and real-time manner.
This is especially challenging when analyzing system logs, which can be CPU intensive and typically
requires human expertise. System log analysis requires that all performed actions by the OS be stored,
and then feature extraction and classification can then be performed.
The following papers focus on analyzing system logs and various ways to achieve this goal. We
break them into two subcategories—those focusing on detection accuracy, and those focusing on IDS
architecture.
Table 2: HIDS with System Logs
IDS Reference Technique Dataset Classifier Learning
Reuning ‘04 [140] Anomaly DARPA99 TF-IDF Supervised
Guan et al. ‘05 [53] Anomaly NA NN Supervised
Zhaojun & Chao ‘10 [183] Anomaly NA NN Supervised
Tchakoucht et al. ‘15 [160] Anomaly Simulation Clustering Unsupervised
Wang & Zhu ‘17 [171] Anomaly KDD99 C5.0 DT Supervised
Due to the
extensiveness of
the topic, not all
papers could be
included in this
survey. Other
notable works in-
clude, but are
not limited to,
the following references, [36, 139, 168, 167].
3.1.1 System Log IDS Research
Reuning [140] describes an anomaly detection system based on Bayesian probability theory and the
term frequency inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) information retrieval technique. TF-IDF is
applied to event log messages, treating each entry as an individual document. First, system training
is required, in which data over a chosen time interval is collected and indexed into hash table, where
each term is mapped to its TF-IDF weight. Messages with high scores, defined as the sum of the
TF-IDF scores of the messages’ terms, are detected. Results of the experiment on the DARPA99
dataset suggest that using log data solely produces a high false positive rate and many undetected
attacks, but it can become a valuable component of a larger and more complex IDS.
Tchakoucht et al. [160] improve upon the IDS of Yacine et al. [14]. The goal is to help decrease
User-to-Root (U2R) and Remote-to-Local (R2L) attacks that exploit operating system or software
vulnerabilities. User activity is audited based on LoginFlow, LoginFails, SessionDuration, Session-
CPU, FormatCounter, AccessFails, DataVolume, and QuotaOverloadFails, which provide a feature
vector representation for each user’s behavior over a given time period. To characterize user behavior,
k-means clustering identifies groups of similar user behavior. Euclidean distance is calculated to com-
pare new user behavior to the reference profile in the detection phase. An experiment was conducted
with a health information system consisting of three users, a patient, doctor, and an administrator,
including their behavior over 30 days. The experiment resulted in significant improvements during
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learning and testing over Yacine et al.’s previous work [14] with a sizable increase in successfully iden-
tifying users and a large decline in false positives. Achieving good results, Tchakoucht et al. identify
two constraints that can affect accuracy, change in user behavior and the system’s inability to handle
large datasets.
3.1.2 System Log IDS Architecture Research
Guan et al. [53] introduce KIT-I, an architecture for an IDS using system log data. Log data is stored
in a secure server, so even if the computer is compromised, an intruder would not have the ability to
modify log files to cover attack traces. The system consists of two modules, a transferring module
and a neural network (NN) module. The transferring module is used to transfer log data at defined
intervals from a client to a remote logging server via a secure channel, which is implemented using the
SSL library in Java and a Certificate Authority for client to server authentication. The NN module is
used to analyze received log files for abnormal behavior. In this work, no experiments are presented.
Zhaojun & Chao [183] describe a new type of HIDS architecture based on an analysis of system
logs. The architecture contains five modules—log collection and pre-processing, saving and updating,
search and analysis, statistics and analysis, and alarming. During execution of the first four modules,
system logs are collected and turned into records containing fields extracted from three parts of the
system logs, namely, a priority with “Facility” and “Severity” fields, a header with “Timestamp” and
“Hostname” fields, and a message with “Tag” and “Content” fields. A constructed record is stored
in a MySQL database and filtered using regular expressions to extract important records. For the
decision engine, records from the database are transformed into numerical values and then passed
through a back-propagation NN (BPNN) model for analysis. Once analysis is complete, the alarm
module determines how to inform the user, if necessary.
Wang & Zhu [171] propose a centralized HIDS architecture for private cloud computing, with
the main goal to reduce usage of system resources. Their model is built on OpenStack4, an open-
source infrastructure platform for cloud computing) and consists of three nodes, compute, controller,
and network nodes, and four modules, data collection, data pre-processing, detection, and alarm
modules. The collection module uses Logstash5 to gather system logs from all VMs and stores it into
Elasticsearch6 for farther analysis by the detection center, which uses a C5.0 decision tree (DT). If an
anomalous event is detected, the detection center alert to victim VM. This model was tested using the
KDD99 dataset and compared to a traditional HIDS. Comparing the new centralized HIDS with a
traditional HIDS shows that a centralized HIDS CPU utilization is approximately 14% lower, memory
consumption is about 2% less, and the detection rate of 94% is about the same with a slightly longer
detection time.
3.2 Audit Data IDSs
In this survey, audit logs will refer to more granular information than system logs, collected with
the goal of providing a chronological, detailed record of user activities. For example, audit logs
allow visibility into network connections (e.g., source/destination bytes, protocols, etc.), command
line actions (e.g., number of shells opened), privilege escalations, and changes to files. System calls
are included in the audit logs, but the wealth of IDS research using them is discussed separately in
the next section. Audit logs are high volume and costly to collect and manage, but they give higher
fidelity for forensics and detection.
Ilgun [72] illustrates a real-time IDS for UNIX operating system called USTAT (State Transition
Analysis Tool for UNIX), which is the UNIX version of STAT described by Porras et al. [136]. It is
a rule-based IDS and works by matching known patterns to the sequences of audit data gathered by
the audit collection mechanisms of the OS. Some of the aims of USTAT are to automate a matching
4 See www.openstack.org.
5 See https://www.elastic.co/products/logstash.
6 See https://www.elastic.co/products/elasticsearch.
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Table 3: HIDS with Audit Data
IDS Reference Technique Dataset Classifier Learning
Ilgun ’93 [72] Misuse NA Rules NA
Ye et al. ’01, ’02 [179, 178] Misuse,
Anomaly
DARPA98
+ simula-
tion
DT, T 2 test,
χ2 test, Markov
model
Both
Botha & Von Solms ’03 [13] Misuse Self made Rules + Fuzzy
logic
NA
Li & Manikopoulos ’04
[104]
Anomaly Self made OCSVM Unsupervised
Shavlik & Shavlik ’04 [148] Anomaly Self made Winnow, NB Supervised
Lin et al. ’10 [109] Hybrid NA OSSEC, NN Supervised
Mehnaz & Bertino ’17 [116] Anomaly Self made FSA rule-mining Unsupervised
process and make patterns more flexible to adopt to different instances of equivalent attacks. This
proposed IDS is able to detect attacks which involve cooperation of multiple user sections or accounts.
USTAT analysis is based on state changes, where state is “the collection of all volatile, permanent, and
semi-permanent data stores of the system at a specific time” and changes are called actions; therefore,
an attack pattern is defined as a sequence of attacker actions. There are four main components,
the data pre-processor, the knowledge-base component (containing fact-based data of objects of the
system and rule-based data of state transitions), the inference engine (used to infer all states of the
system and detect attacks), and a decision engine (used to chose an action and inform the user about
results from inference engine). The conducted experiment was not focused on detection accuracy but
instead on resources utilization running USTAT with other processes. This resulted in a limitation of
disk throughput when running both USTAT and an audit daemon that collects audit trails.
Ye et al. [179] study data attributes for intrusion detection. Attributes include: (1) individual
event occurrences (e.g., “audit events, system calls, user commands”), frequencies (e.g., “number
of consecutive password failures”), and durations (e.g, “CPU time of a command, duration of a
connection”), (2) event combinations, (3) multiple events frequency and distribution, and (4) event
sequence/transition. They compare the intrusion detection performance of four methods—a super-
vised DT and three unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms utilizing both Hotelling’s T 2 test (T 2
test) and the χ-squared distance (χ2 test)—both multivariate statistical analysis methods, and a first
order Markov model—for intrusion detection in their experiments with the DARPA98 dataset and
simulated attacks. The Markov chain based on an ordering property showed superior performance.
This verifies that the ordering and frequency of audit events provides useful information to detect
intrusions.
Follow-on work by Ye et al. [178] present more results comparing T 2 test and the χ2 test, on audit
trails to detect anomalous behavior. The proposed techniques are better in session-wise analysis (an
entire session is considered an intrusion if it contains a single intrusive event), and overall performance
of χ2 is better than T 2.
Botha & Von Solms [13] implement a hybrid IDS based on comparing user actions with intrusion
actions, using fuzzy logic. These actions are interpreted as phases of an intrusion, which they describe
using their own schema: ”probing,” ”initial access,” ”super-user access,” ”hacking,” ”covering,” and
”backdoor.” These are represented as a graph for comparison using fuzzy logic. The authors developed
a working prototype, and testing was done with the help of 12 users, where ten users were conducting
both “legal” and “illegal” (presumably normal and unauthorized) activities and two users were con-
ducting only legal activities. The system correctly identified both users conducting “legal” activities
by assigning intrusion probabilities of 0%, while the remaining users had probabilities of intrusive
activities between 12% and 48%.
Li & Manikopoulos [104] model user profiles with one-class support vector machines (OCSVMs),
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an unsupervised support vector machine (SVM) technique requiring only the user’s own legitimate
sessions to build the user’s profile, using a year of Windows audit data with a focus on masquerade
detection. This approach allows for easier user management, such as adding and removing users legacy
users, rather than multi-class classification methods. Results show the two-class training achieves a
detection rate of 63% with a 3.7% false alarm rate and one-class training shows a 66.7% detection
rate with a 22% false alarm rate. Even though the one-class training approach results in increased
false alarms, this is offset by easier management and a reduction in training time.
Subsystems can monitor an abundance of system actions in the Windows OS. An anomaly detection
system is presented by Shavlik & Shavlik [148] that performs statistical profiling of users and system
behavior on Windows 2000. Their algorithm uses measurements taken from two-hundred Windows
2000 attributes at one second intervals to generate approximately 1,500 features. Examples of features
are encodings of CPU utilization, data input-output quantities, process information, and differences
and averages of current versus historical values, among others. User behavior is accurately identified
using features with assigned weights. Moreover, unique signatures are created by assigning individual
user feature weights.
Winnow [110], a simple linear binary classification fitting algorithm, generally used with a large
number of features, is tested against Na¨ıve Bayes (NB) classifier. Succeeding training, all features
“vote” every second as “for” or “against” the likelihood of an intrusion occurrence. The weighted votes
are then compared against a threshold to determine if there is an intrusion. During training, Winnow
changes the weight of features that fired on incorrectly labeled instances, similar to perceptron training.
Self-collected data from multiple hosts is used for gathering a baseline for normal users, and the same
from a held-out set of hosts is labeled “intrusions”, with the motivation of identifying insider threats.
Winnow yields a 95% detection rate with a low false-alarm rate (under one per day per computer),
while NB has a 59.2% detection rate and has 2 false alarms per day.
Lin et al. [109] propose an HIDS architecture combining open-source misuse detection with super-
vised learning. Misuse detection is implemented using OSSEC [161] (Open Source HIDS SECurity),
an open-source IDS framework capable of conducting analysis of log files; anomaly detection is im-
plemented using a BPNN. The misuse detection process consists of collecting log data, pre-processing
and analyzing data with OSSEC, and finally reporting results. The anomaly detection process consists
of training the BPNN. This can be trained with login or session activities, resource utilization, file
operation activities, among other data types. BP training may take days or weeks and was cited as
an area of active research. In this work, no testing was discussed.
Mehnaz & Bertino [116] present Ghostbuster, a HIDS that profiles users based on their file-system
access patterns and detects anomalies. The Linux utility blktrace 7 is used to extract sequences
of file access events. During the profile creation phase for each user, a feature vector is created
by encoding file access by sizes (with blocks as units), frequencies, and patterns of files accessed.
Statistical outliers of file access size and frequencies are a cause for alerts, and a finite state automata
(FSA) for access patterns defines rule-based anomaly detection. Performance evaluation is given for
actual file accesses of 77 users for 560 target files over eight weeks, four for training and four for
testing. Results are given for many simulated attacks, and overall high detection rates and low false
positive rates are reported; overhead is reported at 2%.
We note that research for utilizing audit log data for intrusion detection in a cloud environment
is a budding area of research, but is outside of the scope of this work [122, 101, 177, 181].
4 System Call IDSs
System call data is a popular choice for HIDS research, because they are a primary artifact of the
OS kernel; that is, there is no filtering, interpretation, or processing (such as, in the production of
log files), that can obfuscate events [28]. Often the unit of data used for detection is a system call
7 See https://linux.die.net/man/8/blktrace.
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trace, a sequence of all calls invoked by a single process in a given time window. Hence, these IDS
developments sit at an OS-level, but the object of modeling is program level. System calls can be
collected for example with the ‘strace‘ utility, although there are many other ways to collect this same
information. Some common calls include ‘open’, ‘close’, ‘read’, ‘write’, ‘wait’, ‘exit’, ‘mmap’, among
many others. Modern OSes often have hundreds of syscalls, for example the ‘syscalls’ Linux manual
page lists over 300. Drawbacks of system-call-based approaches include the large computational
overhead needed for harvesting and analysis and the large possible variations that potentially lead to
false positives [9].
Because each process produces a sequence of system calls, language modeling techniques are preva-
lent for system call-based HIDSs. In particular, many variations on n-gram features and Markov
models of sequences of calls are configured to produce normal/attack classifications. See Forrest et
al. [43] for a more detailed survey of pre-2008 works leveraging system calls. Critical insights from
this section are as follows:
• While research has shown that normal processes can be profiled using system calls, wide varia-
tions occur across processes, or for fixed processes across different user environments, installation
configurations, etc.
• Detection results are quite sensitive to the length of sequence-based features with six- to eight-grams
being strong choices.
• Short sequences provide less computation during training but are easier to bypass than longer
sequences.
• Augmenting calls with other information, such as arguments of the calls, program counters, and
addresses, can yield higher accuracy with less overhead.
Overall, general trends indicate that features which model sequences are more costly than simple
frequency counts of individual features, but yield better detection. Finally, meta-trends show that as
labeled datasets become popular, a flurry of research ensues allowing IDS comparisons across papers
and testing of many standard machine learning algorithms to flourish.
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Table 4: HIDS Leveraging System Calls
IDS Reference Technique Dataset Classifier Learning
Forest et al. ‘96 [44] Anomaly Simulated Rules Unsupervised
Kosoresow et al. ‘97 [93] Anomaly Self made FSA Unsupervised
Hofmeyr et al. ‘98 [66] Anomaly Simulated
+ Self
made
FSA Unsupervised
Ghosh et al. ‘99 [48, 49] Hybrid DARPA
99
NN Both
Warrender et al. ‘99 [172] Hybrid UNM,
DARPA98
Rules, HMM Unsupervised
Sekar et al. ‘01 [147] Anomaly Simulated
+ Self
made
FSA Unsupervised
Wagner & Dean ‘01 [169] NA Self made Static Analysis NA
Liao & Vemuri ‘02 [106] Hybrid DARPA98 k-NN Both
Abad et al. ‘03 [1] Hybrid Self made RIPPER Both
Feng et al. ‘03 [41] Anomaly Simulated
+ Self
made
FSA Unsupervised
Hoang et al. ‘03, ‘09 [64] Hybrid UNM HMM + Rules Unsupervised
Kruegel et al. ‘03 [96] Anomaly DARPA
99
BN Unsupervised
Kruegel et al. ‘03 [97] Anomaly DARPA
99
Probability models Unsupervised
Jha et al. ‘04 [74] Anomaly UNM Filtering, Markov
Models
Unsupervised
Tandon & Chan ‘05, ‘06 [157,
158]
Anomaly UNM,
DARPA98
Rules Unsupervised
Han & Cho ‘05 [60] Anomaly DARPA99 ENN Unsupervised
Zhang et al. ‘05 [182] Hybrid DARPA98 k-NN, Robust SVM,
SVM, OCSVM
Both
Gao et al. ‘06 [46] Anomaly Self made HMM-based distance Unsupervised
Hu et al. ‘09 [68] Anomaly UNM,
DARPA98
HMM Unsupervised
Ahmed et al. ‘09 [2] Hybrid UNM RBFNN Supervised
Tong et al. ‘09 [162] Hybrid DARPA RBFNN + ENN Supervised
Ye et al. ‘10 [180] Anomaly NA Rules Unsupervised
Jewell & Beaver ‘11 [73] Anomaly Self made Rules Unsupervised
Elgraini et al. ‘12 [39] Anomaly UNM NB with a MM Unsupervised
Xie et al. ‘13, ‘14 [174, 176, 175] Anomaly ADFA-LD k-NN, OCSVM, k-
Means
Unsupervised
Creech & Hu ‘14 [28] Anomaly UNM,
ADFA-
LD,
KDD98
ELM NN Supervised
Anandapriya & Lakshmanan
‘15 [6]
Anomaly ADFA-LD SVM, ELM NN Supervised
Gupta & Kumar ‘15 [54] Misuse UNM Rules Unsupervised
Haider et al. ‘15 [58] Anomaly ADFA-LD k-NN Unsupervised
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4.1 Sequential Features (n-Grams)
Early work of Forrest and Longstaff [44] provide preliminary HIDS results by characterizing normal
(frequent) and then identifying abnormal (infrequent) short sequences of System calls. One way
to conceptualize the main idea is that System calls are “words”, sequences of calls form “phrases”.
The general trend incurs relatively large computational expense for feature extraction and/or model
training, but reap strong detection metrics.
Similar anomaly detectors based on modeling n-grams of system calls were explored by others,
but without statistically modeling their frequencies [66, 93]. Helman & Bhangoo [63] rank system call
traces by the likelihood of n-grams in normal versus attack scenarios. Ye et al. [180] use set theory
to design an algorithm that learns rules defining normal system call sequences, then detect anomalies
based on votes from the rules, although no testing is presented.
For each process, Jewell & Beaver [73] consider variable length sequence of System calls, defined
as an observed sequence of System calls for which no call occurs twice. Comparing this with other
sequential features, (e.g., n-grams), they observe that the counts of the system call sequences observed
plateau for normal user activity faster than other definitions, and the counts spike upon novel activity.
With the goal of identifying malicious data exfiltration activities in real-time, an experiment in which
researchers were challenged to exfiltrate three file collections on a given set of machines over two days
is used to collect malicious and normal system call data, which is used to validate the approach.
Elgraini et al. [39] estimate the probability of a sequence of calls conditioned on the class (nor-
mal/attack) using a first order Markov model—P (s1, s2, ...|C) = P (s1|C)P (s2|s1, C).... Finally, a NB
approach is used to find the most likely class. Results are compared to many other previous classifiers
on data from the University of New Mexico (UNM), finding that this method performs similarly.
Creech & Hu [28] make two innovations for a HIDS based on kernel level system call traces, (1)
creating semantic features of system call sequences (phrases) by defining a context free grammar
and (2) using an extreme learning machine (ELM)—a neural network (NN) classifier of Huang et
al. [69]. This approach takes per-host training that is computationally costly, taking days or weeks,
although once trained, labeling (or decoding) is fast and accuracy results are very strong, reported
via the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve using the Darpa988 and ADFA-LD datasets.
Anandapriya & Lakshmanan [6] also test anomaly detection results using semantic features with the
ELM on the ADFA-LD dataset.
Gupta & Kumar [54] define a signature for a program as the admissible bigrams of calls, specifically
those seen in training. This allows lightweight detection of programs with a variety of new two-
sequences of calls that gives highly accurate results as tested on the UNM dataset. Their work
discusses implementation for cloud infrastructure using multiple VMs.
4.2 Frequency-Based Features: A Cheaper Alternative
In response to the costly but effective sequence-based features, research to develop and test more
computationally inexpensive, frequency-based features from system call traces finds, at least for the
AFDS-LD dataset, that such features still produce strong accuracy results.
Liao & Vemuri [106] regard traces as documents represented with the vector of TF-IDF scores
for each word (system call). The k−nearest neighbor (k-NN) with cosine similarity distance is used
for anomaly detection. If a process is classified as intrusive, the whole session it belongs to is also
considered an attack session. Liao et. al performed the experiment using the names of System calls
recorded in Basic Security Module9 (BSM) audit data from DARPA98 dataset; they exhibited over
90% TPR with under 2% FPR. The second experiment preempted this TF-IDF anomaly detector
with signature verification. First, each process is compared to a set of abnormal processes using
cosine similarity, and, if they match, the process is marked as intrusive. Otherwise, the k-NN anomaly
detection process is used to classify the process. This two-stage workflow produced 91.7% detection
8Darpa98 is sometimes referred to in other literature as KDD98.
9 See https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19457-01/801-6636/801-6636.pdf.
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rate and 0.59% false positive rate with threshold of 0.8. This method is computationally efficient,
with complexity O(N), with N as the number of processes.
Continuing the system call/trace interpretation as words or documents, respectively, Zhang et
al. [182] propose two novel techniques to lower false positives. First, a modified TF-IDF score is crafted
from system call traces; second, the authors build a detector using supervised training with Robust
SVMs to battle noisy training data, OCSVMs for unsupervised training, and k-NN. Online-training
of the SVMs is used to decrease training time while preserving accuracy of intrusion detection. Clean
and noisy datasets are generated from system calls of privileged processes in the DARPA98 dataset,
these are used to compare each classifier with and without their modifications. Results showed that
the detection accuracy of the modified classifiers is the same or higher than the baseline, when tested
with both the clean and noisy datasets, while the training time ratio for the modified SVM over the
original is between 51.61% and 66.67% (i.e., retraining is significantly faster).
Xie & Hu, and Xie et al. [174, 176, 175] consider simple features such as a trace’s length, and
the relative frequency of each call in that trace, and achieve “acceptable” detection results (i.e., ROC
curves) in their testing with the ADFA-LD dataset, using simple one-class classifiers; namely, k-NN,
OCSVM, and k-means algorithms.
Haider et al. [58] propose using different, but still inexpensive, statistical features on system call
traces of the ADFA-LD dataset, with the same goal of fast performance of transforming data to
features without sacrificing accuracy of detection. Four features, namely, the least/most repeated and
the minimum/maximum values in a trace, are used to represent a trace to detect attacks, and three
supervised learning algorithms, SVM with linear and radial basis kernels and k-NN, are used. Results
show k-NN receives a 78% TPR, average(FPR, FNR) = 21%. These results increased the TPR over
works of Xie & Hu, and Xie et al. [174, 176, 175], for similar false positive metrics, but are far less
accurate than the computationally expensive work of Creech et al. [28]. Although this set of work
used the same dataset, it is not clear from the authors’ treatment if the experiments provide a fair
comparison across papers.
4.3 Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) for System Call Modeling
HMMs are a natural data model for sequential data and many other works employ HMMs for system-
call-based IDSs. Warrender et al. [172] compare four methods of detection based on n-grams of
system call traces: list-and-lookup of observed sequences, relative frequencies, RIPPER rule induction
algorithm of Cohen [26], and HMMs. Their conclusions indicate that sufficiently accurate detection
results are achievable by more computationally efficient algorithms than HMMs, and that accuracy
results are more dependent on test datasets than the algorithm chosen.
Gao et al. [46] create a novel HMM-based metric that reports better IDS results than their previous
“evolutionary distance (ED)” metric, while also obtaining 6% faster performance.
Hoang et al. [65] develop a hybrid detection scheme that uses both a HMM to model system call
sequences and a “normal” database, which includes the frequency of each observed database short
sequence. Fuzzy rules are defined to classify a newly-observed sequence and take into account the
sequence’s probability (computed via the HMM) and frequency in the normal database.
HMM training is performed using an incremental method in conjunction with an initial param-
eter optimization method to reduce the high cost incurred during computation. Validation on the
AFDA-LD dataset exhibit a lowering of false positive rate of 48% while indicating greater anomaly
detection than a “normal-sequence database scheme and a two-layer scheme.” In addition, the HMM
training time realized a 75% reduction while simultaneously decreasing the memory usage. This hy-
brid approach follows their earlier work [64], where first the “normal” database is used to determine
frequency, and second HMM-likelihood is computed detect anomalies of only those sequences of sys-
tem calls that are rare or unseen in training. Experiments on the UNM’s dataset (only using sendmail
program traces) prove that this approach is better in detecting anomalous behavior of programs in
terms of accuracy and response time than a conventional single layer approach; however, the HMM
model training is expensive. The integrated system is able to produce higher levels of anomaly signals
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as soon as an intrusion occurs. Known problems include storage requirements, reducing the training
cost of the HMM, and determining the parameters of the model automatically.
Hu et al. [68] propose a pre-processing and training approach for HMMs that halves training time
of traditional HMMs with “reasonable” accuracy, i.e., with some adverse effect to the false detection
rate as tested on UNM and DARPA98 datasets. In general, the work breaks training sequences into
many small sequences, and train many “small” HMMs, and finally take take a weighted average.
4.4 Other System Call IDS Works
Jha et. al. [74] introduce a novel statistic-based anomaly detection algorithm for system call sequences.
They observe that after Markov models (not HMMs) are learned from observed sequences of System
calls, an observed sequence is assumed to be a mixture of the learned models and a chaotic model.
Bayesian techniques are used to optimized the mixing parameter, and if it is greater than a specified
threshold, an alert is raised. By using mixtures of Markov chains, their filtering approach can model
mixtures of system call traces from multiple users, potentially in cases involving multiple users co-
operating. Additionally, the filtering based approach can address the masquerade-detection problem,
allowing for the identification of the user that generated a given execution trace based on usage pat-
terns. Results for many configuration parameters are given on the UNM data set. Comparing this
technique to HMMs, one finds that Markov chain training is O(m), with m the length of the trace,
while HMM training has complexity O(n ∗m2), where n denotes the number of HMM states.
Ghosh et al. [48, 49] test artificial neural networks (ANNs) for misuse (supervised) and anomaly
detection (unsupervised) using the DARPA99 dataset. For anomaly detection, a NN is trained using
normal data and randomly generated data (for simulated attacks). ROC curves are given showing
strong results, notably, a TPR of 77.3% and a FPR of 2.2%.
Han & Cho [60] introduce an IDS utilizing evolutionary neural networks (ENNs) to simultaneously
calculate the NNs structure and weights. For labeled training data, ambient system call sequences are
labeled normal (non-attack) and randomly generated sequences are labeled anomalous (attack) at a
rate of 2-to-1. Experiments with an ENN produced a 0.0011% false-alarm rate while obtaining a 100%
detection rate using the DARPA99 data set. Performance shows that training the ENNs takes about
an hour; in comparison, this is about order of magnitude longer than training any single, comparably
structured NN, but about an order of magnitude less than a grid search over many traditional NNs.
Tong et al. [162] propose a new hybrid IDS using Radial Basis Function (RBF) NN with Elman
NNs (ElNN) for both anomaly and misuse detection. RBFNN classifies events in real time, passing
output as an input into the ElNN. Positively (respectively, negatively) detected events by the RBFNN
increase (respectively, decrease) a context weight in the ElNN, which improves accuracy and decreases
the false positive rate. This technique is advantageous due to its memory of prior seen sequences—it is
robust to sparse occurrences of misuse or anomalies but will detect high temporal density of anomalies
and misuse—and it exhibits faster training time, as compared to the Multilayer Perception (MLP)
NN IDS of Ghosh et al. [48]. Evaluations with the DARPA dataset resulted in an anomaly detection
accuracy of 93%, false positive rate of 2.6%, and a misuse detection accuracy of 95.3% with a 1.4%
false positive rate. Results were compared to [48] and [77], ultimately producing higher accuracy and
lower false positive rates.
Ahmed & Masood [2] test radial basis function NNs on the UNM dataset, exhibiting accurate
detection. Explicitly, they optimize y(x) =
∑N
1
wiφσi (x− µi), for a spherical radial basis function φ
centered at µi with variance σ
2
i
(i.e., φσi(x) = exp(−σ
−2
i
‖x‖2)) to learn wi, σi, µi, and they augment
the training algorithm to also learn N , the number of basis functions.
Wagner & Dean [169] use static analysis to automatically derive three models of application’s
system call behavior. Immediate detection of a program’s wrongful behavior allows for the detection
of intrusions. More generally static analysis is a large area of research that is outside the scope of this
HIDS survey. See other static analysis surveys [70, 120].
Kruegel et al. [96] create anomaly detectors modeling four features of system calls. These four
detectors outputs are dependent nodes in novel Bayesian network (BN), along with dependent nodes
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for the four detectors confidence, and a single independent node for the classification. Results show
perfect detection rates with a 0.2% FPR. Training time is costly (NP-hard), but labeling is O(N)
with N as the number of nodes in the network.
4.5 Using System Call Arguments and Additional Data
In addition to modeling the system calls, incorporating the arguments of the calls or memory pointers
has garnered IDS results.
Abad et al. [1] describe an IDS based on correlating network traffic to system calls and aiming to
increase the detection rate and decrease the false positive rate for both misuse and anomaly detection.
Two approaches were taken, top-down, where attacks’ behavior is analyzed to identify which logs can
contain evidence of attack, and bottom-up, where multiple logs are analyzed to detect a specific attack.
The bottom-up approach finds attacks through log correlation, and since logs may have millions of
entries, the RIPPER data mining tool is used for record filtration. To conduct the experiment, the
authors used RIPPER, a rule mining algorithm that attempts to “predict the next system call”,
combined with log correlation using both System calls and network traffic. These ideas follow from
work of Lee & Stolfo [102]. Results show an increased detection rate and a decreased false positive
rate.
For each system call (e.g., read, write, ..) for each process (e.g., sendmail), Kruegel et al. [97]
build models of normal arguments’ string lengths, characters, and structure. Similar features found
in Kruegel et al. [96] are used on System calls, not arguments. For anomaly detection, arguments
with sufficiently different features are flagged, and the detector exhibits strong detection accuracy.
Overhead is investigated, showing about 5Kb of memory is required, and 18% (of a 2003 era) processor
was used. Follow-on research of Mutz et al. [123] uses the same Bayesian network of Kruegel et al. [96]
to combine these system call argument feature anomaly detectors into an ensemble.
Tandon & Chan [157, 158] develop an anomaly detection system based on rule learning techniques
that leverage both system calls and their arguments. Results show gains over using just System
calls, but at significant computational expense (an order of magnitude higher). Similarly, other works
leveraging the arguments of System calls to enhance system-call-based detectors became prevalent at
this time; e.g., see Bhatkar et al. [12] and Sufatrio & Yap [153].
Sekar et al. [147] use finite state automata (FSA) to model the programs’ code path by combining
System calls (transitions between states) with program counter information (to learn states). This is a
computationally cheaper approach than the HMM and n-gram techniques, and also improves accuracy
over these techniques. To create a model of the virtual path between calls, Feng et al. [41] incorporate
dynamic extraction of return addresses in addition to the FSA approach, yielding additional accuracy
without increased cost.
4.6 System Call Mimicry Attacks
Finally, we note that system-call IDS developments are met with research designing attacks to evade
such measures, with key ideas including “mimicry” attacks, where null-effect calls pad the malicious
sequence of effective calls [50, 79, 80, 81, 95, 169] or malicious call sequences are sufficiently small to
evade detection [156, 155].
5 Windows Registry IDSs
Windows Registry is the OS’s key-value database containing configuration settings for all programs
and hardware on that host. This database is heavily used during computer operation.
All processes use the Registry, including malware that also often modify the Registry to achieve
their aim [67]. Consequently, Registry monitoring has been leveraged by many researcher efforts for
forensic analysis [19, 35, 114]. Below we survey the few works that build HIDS from Registry data.
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Initial work by Apap et al. [9] proposed the Registry Anomaly Detection (RAD) system, consisting
of three components, an audit sensor to log Registry activities, a model of normal behavior, and a
real-time anomaly detector. RAD extracts five raw features from Registry accesses, namely: (1) the
process accessing the registry, (2) the query type requested, (3) the key used, (4) its value, and (5)
the outcome (e.g., success, error) called the response. Importantly, any anomaly detection algorithm
that can accommodate these sparse feature vectors is applicable. In this initial work, the probability
of each feature (5 distributions), and conditional probability of pairs of features (20 distributions)
are estimated following Friedman and Singer [45], and the detection system alerts if any of the 25
estimates are below a threshold. An advantage of this estimation is that models are continually
updated without any user interaction.
Heller et al. [62] and a follow-on publication of Stolfo et al. [152] both test OCSVMs for the
anomaly detection component of RAD with three different kernels and conclude that the probabilistic
anomaly detector (PAD) of Apap et al. is much more accurate. Computational analysis is also given.
Table 5: Registry Anomaly Detection Systems
IDS Reference Technique Performance
Cost
Memory
Cost
Apap et al. ‘02 [9] PAD O(v2d2) O(vd2)
Heller et al. ‘03 [62] OCSVMs O(dL3) O(d(L +
T ))
Stolfo et al. ‘05 [152] OCSVMs O(dL3) O(d(L +
T ))
Topallar et al. ‘04
[163]
SOM
Here v denotes number of unique records, d the number of features, L the number of training records, and T
the number of testing records.
PAD takes time O(v2d2) and space O(vd2) where v denotes the number of unique records, and
d denotes number of record components (dimension). The OCSVM takes time O(dL3) and space
O(d(L+T )) where L, T denote the number of training records, and testing records, respectively. The
comparison of algorithms was conducted on Pentium Celeron with 512MB RAM with memory usage
of under 3MB, and 3%-5% of CPU usage.
Topallar et al. [163] refer to the RAD system, but propose the use of Self-Organizing Maps (SOM),
a NN model, as an algorithm for anomaly detection. The abstract claims their results demonstrate a
low false positive rate in comparison to other IDSs.
6 File System IDSs
This section surveys work that propose or test IDSs that monitor host file-systems for detection.
File systems have visibility to stored data, executables, and metadata used to service file requests.
Malicious actions often involve modifying or adding new files or metadata (e.g. to allow unauthorized
future access or remove evidence of previous access), leveraging file systems to monitor files, access
to files, or determine legitimacy of any requests to the file system is a promising avenue for intrusion
detection and prevention. Since file-system IDSs are logically separate from the OS, they are harder
to disable and allow monitoring after compromise. The primary drawback of storage-based IDSs is
their limited visibility.
First available in 1992, Tripwire10, from Kim & Spafford [90], is perhaps the most notable file-
integrity tool. Tripwire is an open-source and now commercially available IDS for detection and
10 See www.tripwire.org.
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Table 6: File System Detection Systems
IDS Reference Name Rule Base
Kim & Spafford ‘94 [90] Tripwire Checksum
Griffin et al.‘03 [52] Disk-Based IDS Policy
Pennington et al. ‘03 [133] Storage-Based IDS Checksum & policy
Patil et al. ‘04 [131] I3FS Checksum & policy
remediation of malicious file and configuration changes originally designed for the UNIX system. A
checklist of information about important files is created periodically and compared against previous
versions to detect unexpected or unauthorized file changes. Details of the original system implemen-
tation and use are reported in the publication cited above. Notably, the system was deployed and in
use before the publication.
Griffin et al. [52] implement “IDS functionality in the firmware of workstations’ locally attached
disks,” where the majority of system files lie. The Intrusion Detection for Disks (IDD) system moni-
tors the file system for suspicious file manipulations, such as unauthorized reads, writes, file meta-data
modifications, suspicious access patterns, compromises of file integrity, or other events which may in-
dicate an intrusion. Since this IDS is required to run on separate hardware, it is protected even if the
system it is monitoring has been compromised, so long as the storage device and administrative com-
puter are uncompromised. The system has four main design requirements: specifying access policies,
securely administrating the IDD, monitoring, and responding to policy violations. The system’s ar-
chitecture consists of three main components: (1) the bridge process on the host computer, to connect
the administrator and IDD, (2) the request de-multiplexer, to differentiate administrative requests
from other requests, and (3) a policy manager on the IDD, to monitor the system for violations and
generate alerts. An evaluation using a prototype disk-based IDS into a SCSI (Small Computer System
Interface) disk emulator and using PostMark trans and SSH-build filesystem benchmarks indicates
that it is feasible to include IDS functionality in low-cost desktop disk drives, in terms of CPU and
memory costs.
Pennington et al. [133] propose an Intrusion Detection on Disk, a rule-based IDS embedded in the
storage interface and monitoring the file system. The system prototype uses a set of rules to monitor
important files and binary changes (following Tripwire [90]) and rules to detect patterns of changes
to the file system. Testing on 16 rootkits and two worms shows that 15 are identified by the IDS,
and three of the detected 15 modify the kernel to hide from other file-system integrity checkers (e.g.,
Tripwire). Examples of alerting activities include “modifying system binaries, adding files to system
directories, scrubbing the audit log, or using suspicious file names.” The overhead of the system is
investigated, and results show under 2MB of memory is needed. The primary advantages of this
storage-based IDS are its independence from the host (if the host system is compromised, extra steps
are necessary to disable this IDS), and that modifications to the storage device are necessary if any
malware is to persist across reboots.
Patil et al. [131] describe I3FS, an In-kernel Integrity checker and Intrusion detection File System;
this is an IDS based on real-time, in-kernel, on-access integrity file checking. The proposed IDS is
modular and can be mounted on any file system. The main goal is to restrict access and notify
administrators if an intrusion is detected. The system is compared against Tripwire [90] and can
overcome its limitations—intruder tampering, large performance overhead, and inability of real-time
detection. I3FS uses security policies and cryptographic checksums of files computed using MD5, and
stores both in four in-kernel Berkeley databases: policy, checksums, checksum metadata, and access
counter databases. IDS security is implemented by adding an authentication mechanism which allows
for file calls interception and by using policies and previously computed checksums to determine file
integrity to allow or deny access to those files, and possibly alerting system administrators. I3FS is
primarily designed to prevent replacement of legitimate files with files containing malicious content,
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unauthorized modification of data, and data corruption. The system was tested using CPU, I/O, and
custom read benchmarks. Results indicate that performance overhead under normal user workload is
4%, and can be modified by setting system parameters and changing system policies.
File system monitoring is frequently used in HIDSs that leverage virtual environments. Quynh
& Takefuji [137] propose monitoring a system by implementing sniffing and forwarding file system
call logs (e.g., map, open, write) to a privileged VM. Ko et al. [92] design a “file-centric logger” that
watches file accesses and transfers and can be implemented in cloud VMs and physical environments.
A tool is provided for the end user to verify personal file tampering. Gupta et al. [55, 56] describe a
lightweight and platform independent HIDS based on monitoring file system integrity while running
as privileged VM. Jin et al. [76] implement VMFence, which includes file integrity monitoring, among
other
(network-oriented) features.
Distributed and more comprehensive IDS architectures leveraging file-integrity for detection exist
as well, see Demara et al. [33]. Their work also provides a short survey of existing frameworks for
file-system IDSs.
7 Program Analysis and Monitoring Techniques
This section focuses on a few works that that leverage information about processes, process trees, or
specific binaries on a host for detection. We note that this has significant overlap with other security
sub-fields, such as dynamic malware analysis and application vulnerability analysis. A detailed survey
of these related topics is out of scope for this survey.
Table 7: Program Analysis for Detection Works
IDS Reference Data Source Classifier Learning
Schultz et al. ‘01 [146] Binary, DLL, calls RIPPER, NB, MNB Supervised
Newsome & Song ‘05 [125] Binary Rules Unsupervised
Moscovitch et al. 07 [121] Program’s resource utilization DT, NB, BN, ANN Supervised
Khan et al. ‘16, ’17 [88, 87] Process’ network utilization AdaBoost Supervised
Vaas & Happa ‘17 [165]
Table 8: Schultz et. al. [146] Results
Algorithm Feature Type TPR FPR
Signatures Bytes 33.75% 0%
RIPPER DLLs 57.89% 9.22%
RIPPER DLLfunction calls 71.05% 7.77%
RIPPER DLLs with counted
function calls
52.63% 5.34%
NB Strings 97.43% 3.80%
MNB Bytes 97.76% 6.01%
Here TPR is true positive rate, and FPR is false positive
rate.
Schultz et al. [146] describe a framework
for automatic detection of malicious executa-
bles before they run. Different data mining
algorithms are explored to determine the best
algorithm for new binaries.
Experiments used three data mining al-
gorithms; RIPPER, NB, and Multi-Na¨ıve
Bayes (MNB), and five types of fea-
tures—Dynamically Loaded Libraries (DLL)
used by the binary, DLL function calls made
by the binary, number of unique function calls
within each DLL, strings extracted from bi-
nary files, and byte sequences. To conduct
the experiment, a dataset of malicious and benign executables were created from McAfee’s virus
scanner. Results were compared to conventional signature based detectors and are summarized in
Table 8.
TaintCheck, a system that can “perform dynamic taint analysis by performing binary rewriting at
run time” was developed by Newsome & Song [125]. Data originating from or influenced by any input,
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e.g., memory addresses and format strings that are not supplied by the code itself, i.e., are supplied
by external inputs or mathematical computation, are considered tainted, and when used unsafely
indicates likely vulnerable code. TaintCheck identifies tainted code, then monitors instructions that
manipulate it (e.g, MOVE, LOAD, PUSH instructions), and finally identifies if the data is used in a
manner that violates set policies (e.g., as input to a system call). It reliably detects most types of
exploits while producing no false positives, and permits semantic analysis using signatures.
Moscovitch et al. [121] test four machine learning techniques: DT, NB, BN, and ANN. Each has
different feature subsets to detect unknown malware based on characteristics of known malware, in
particular worms, using computer measurements, such as memory usage, disk usage, CPU usage, etc.
To examine worm behavior, the authors used five known worms,which all perform port scanning and
other actions. A variety of configurations were created, using machines with different hardware and
using different levels of activity from background tasks and user tasks. Four hypotheses were tested:
the method can reach detection accuracy of known malware above 90% and detection accuracy of
unknown worms above 80%; the computer configuration and background activities have no significant
influence on detection; furthermore, at most 30 features are needed to attain the same accuracy as
full set. All goals were achieved, with BNs consistently producing accurate results.
Khan et al. [88] introduce an anomaly detection HIDS based on a modified AdaBoost ensemble
classifier. They add an “information fractal (cognitive) dimension approach”, which assigns higher
weights to weak classifiers, which puts emphasis on misclassified samples to improve their estimation.
This idea stems from fractal dimension theory [91]. A host sensor is utilized to collect the network
profile of processes (process ID, time started, and the process’s network connection information) and
modules on Windows 7 OS.
To conduct the experiment, authors collected 333,692 data samples for 1 hour and used malware
detected by 3 out of 54 antivirus companies, according to VirusTotal11. To build a classifier, the
dataset was partitioned into 70% and 30% as training and testing sets, respectively. Results indicate
that the proposed AdaBoost algorithm reduces the error 60% more than the traditional algorithm
with 30 less iterations. A comparison shows an improvement in detecting true positives from 93.93%
to 95.27% and a reduction of false negatives from 6.06% to 4.73%; however, detection of true negatives
decreased from 100% to 97.14% and false positives increased from 0.0% to 13.7% A similar fractal
approach by many of the same authors, Siddiqui et al. [149] uses k-NN with a fractal weighting
approach on network data for detection, and further work in Khan et al. [87] attempting to model
polymorphic malware with fractal analysis of the process tree.
Vaas & Happa [165] design a client-server architecture that observes process’ memory consump-
tion. Snapshots of each process are collected over a time window containing its resource utilization
and timestamp, with the goal of identifying anomalous behavior of a machine’s processes on a per-
application basis. The method consists of three phases: acquisition, learning, and production. A
memory fingerprint is gathered during the acquisition phase. During the learning phase, a model
of each application is computed from the fingerprint and the model is used to create an anomaly
detector. During the production phase, the quality of the model is assessed. The model is then tested
with user process data, and results indicate an ability to distinguish processes by their virtual memory
fingerprints. To increase efficiency during the learning phase, in order to make application models
available more quickly, parallel machine learning techniques are utilized.
8 Host-Relevant Algorithms Tested on Network Traffic
This subsection surveys select works that focus on algorithmic development. Most focus on advancing
detection metrics or performance as tested on the DARPA- and KDD-related datasets; hence, their
presentation falls under NIDS applications, but the detection algorithms can be applied to HIDS. Note
a progression in the literature from testing standard machine learning algorithms against each other,
11 See www.virustotal.com.
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Table 9: Selected algorithmic developments for IDS, not tested on host data but applicable
IDS Reference Technique Dataset Classifier Learning
Barbara´ et al. ’01 [11] Anomaly DARPA99 Rule mining, DT Supervised
Ambwani ’03 [4] Hybrid DARPA98 SVM Supervised
Amor et al. ’04 [5] Hybrid KDD99 NB Supervised
Liu et al. ’04 [111] Anomaly KDD99 Genetic Cluster-
ing
Unsupervised
Chen et al. ’07 [21] Misuse KDD99, DARPA98 NN Supervised
Kayacik et al. ’07 [84] Anomaly KDD99 Hierarchical
SOM
Unsupervised
O¨zyer et al. ’07 [128] Hybrid KDD99 Rules+boosting Supervised
Peddabachigari et al. ’07
[132]
Anomaly KDD99 DT, SVM, DT-
SVM, Ensemble
Supervised
Tajbakhsh et al. ’09 [154] Hybrid KDD99 ABC Supervised
Wang et al. ’10 [170] Hybrid KDD99 FC-ANN Both
Nadiammai et al. ’11 [124] Misuse KDD99 ZR, DT, RF Supervised
Lin et al. ’12 [107] Misuse KDD99 DT and SVM Supervised
Kim et al. ’14 [89] Hybrid NSL-KDD DT and SVM Supervised
De la Hoz et al. ’14 [30] Hybrid DARPA98, NSL-
KDD
NSGA-II+GH-
SOM
Supervised
Eesa et al. ’15 [38] Misuse KDD99 CFA-DT Supervised
Lin et al. ’15 [108] Hybrid KDD99 Clustering Supervised
Ravale et al. ’15 [138] Hybrid KDD99 k-means + RB-
SVM
Supervised
Harshaw et al. ’16 [61] Anomaly Self-made Graphprints Unsupervised
Ikram & Cherukuri ’16 [71] Hybrid NSL-KDD, GURE-
KDD
PCA+SVM Supervised
Mishra et al. ’16 [117] Hybrid KDD99 NB, NN, C4.5 DT Supervised
Zhu et al. ’17 [184] Hybrid NSL-KDD, GURE-
KDD, KDD99
I-NSGA-III Supervised
to testing ensembles to gain accuracy, to parallelization and GPU acceleration efforts, and finally to
pre-composing the classifiers with data-driven feature selection algorithms. For the interested reader,
we note that this section complements the survey of Buczac & Guven [18], which also surveys only a
minority of the many works focusing on machine learning advancements for detection, most of which
are also tested on NIDS datasets, though Buczac & Guven focus on more detailed analyses of the
algorithms involved.
Barbara´ et al. [11] introduce a new IDS, Audit Data Analysis and Mining (ADAM), for anomaly
detection. ADAM is designed to be used on-line and is implemented using a data mining technique to
build rules of normal behavior and a classifier to identify attacks in TCP dump recorded traffic. First,
using data mining, ADAM builds a repository of attack-free items. Then using an online, sliding-
window algorithm, it identifies frequent items to compare with the repository. Abnormal items are
classified via a DT as a known attack, unknown attack, or false alarm. The system was tested using
DARPA99 dataset and took third.
Ambwani et al. [4] propose a multi-class SVM classifier using a one-versus-one method12 to identify
various misuse and attacks by type. The authors cite previous research to claim one-versus-one
outperforms one-versus-all methods. An experiment is conducted using labeled 10% training and
testing sets from the KDD99 dataset. Accuracy (91%) and performance are reported.
Amor et al. [5] compare NB and DT classifiers for intrusion detection, concluding DT is slightly
12 To create an n-class classifier, the one-versus-one method trains binary classifiers to distinguish each of the n(n−1)/2
pairs of classes. Usually a voting scheme collects the n(n− 1)/2 votes to make a final classification.
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more accurate but learning and classifying is seven times longer. There were three experiments
performed on the KDD99 traffic data, and both algorithms perform in the 91-94% range.
Liu et al. [111] describe an unsupervised, clustering-based approach, using a genetic algorithm to
classify network traffic. This approach achieves good results overall when evalutated with the KDD99
datasets, and includes an adjustable sensitivity factor, i.e., a parameter to trade false positives for
false negatives.
Chen et al. [21] present an evolutionary NN—meaning the NN structure is learned as well as
the parameters during training—trained by a particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm with
flexible bipolar sigmoid activation functions. This work focuses on improving the intrusion detection
performance by selecting an effective small subset of the input features. The algorithm’s effectiveness
is demonstrated on network data from the KDD99 dataset, and then its application to host-based
datasets is discussed.
Kayacik et al. [84] demonstrate an unsupervised approach, using a hierarchy of SOMs, which
results in similar detection rates as supervised approaches in other publications. When tested on the
KDD99 dataset, the false positive rate of this unsupervised approach is about three times higher than
supervised methods, and the authors discuss ways to reduce this further.
O¨zyer et al. [128] describe an intelligent intrusion detection system (IIDS) that iteratively learns
association and classification rules. Fuzzy association rule mining and filtering is used for each class,
then a boosting algorithm is used for classification. Results appeared to be close to the KDD99
winning entry and proved the usefulness of this boosted fuzzy classifier. The authors believe that
results can be farther improved with an increased training dataset.
Peddabachigari et al. [132] evaluate four classifiers for intrusion detection: DT, SVM, hybrid
DT-SVM (first data is passed through a DT, and then the same data plus the result of the DT is
passed through an SVM), and an ensemble, with the main goal to find the most accurate algorithm.
Experiments are conducted on the KDD99 dataset, and it was determined that the ensemble approach
performed the best. It classified non-attack, Probe, DoS, U2R, and R2U attacks with 99.70%, 100%,
99.92%, 68%, and 97.16% of accuracy, respectively. To utilize the achieved results, a hybrid IDS is
proposed, employing ensemble classifiers.
Tajbakhsh et al. [154] describe an IDS using fuzzy association rules and Association Based Clas-
sification (ABC) for misuse detection and an ABC extension for anomaly detection. The objective is
a fast data mining technique that can be used to implement an IDS. The association rule induction
algorithm grows exponentially according to the dataset’s feature quantity. To accelerate this tech-
nique they introduce a concept called association hyper-edge, which reduces the above problem to a
graph problem. The main challenge of the proposed classification is to define appropriate matching
measures; two solutions are described and tested. Evaluations of their misuse detection approach
using the KDD99 dataset realized a 91% detection rate and a 3.34% false positive rate; the anomaly
detection approach had a detection rate of 80.6% with 2.95% false positive rate for all records with
total execution time of about 500s. Detection of novel attacks was much less effective, as the mis-
use detection approach resulted in 11% detection rate for new attacks, and the anomaly detection
approach resulted in 20.5% detection rate for these new attacks.
Wang et al. [170] describe an IDS using fuzzy clustering (FC) to partition training data into
subsets and train an NN on each subset; the results are aggregated with a fuzzy aggregation module
for detection. An experiment was conducted using the KDD99 dataset, and results concluded that
FC-ANN works similar to BPNN, NB, and DT in detecting high frequency attacks, and outperforms
in detecting low frequency attacks. The average accuracy of this method is 96.71%. Training time is
higher than the other methods, but can be improved with parallelization.
Nadiammai et al. [124] determine the severity of attacks in a dataset with data mining methods.
Several classifiers are used to determine the classification accuracy. The Zero R (ZR) classifier, DT
classifier, and Random Forest (RF) classifier are compared using the KDD99 dataset. Results show
that RF outperforms the other classification algorithms.
Lin et al. [107] develop an IDS based on SVMs and DTs, and use Simulated Annealing (SA)—a
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probabilistic optimization technique for avoiding local optima—for feature selection and parameter
selection. This is evaluated with the KDD99 dataset, and the results show very high accuracy. SVM
and SA can find the optimal subset of features for anomaly intrusion detection accuracy evaluation
while DT and SA can obtain decision rules for new attacks and can improve accuracy of classification.
Mishra et al. [117] propose two IDS frameworks for a cloud network to detect a broad range
of attacks and focus on speed and efficiency by employing parallelization techniques. Two types of
parallelization were introduced, splitting traffic into multiple sensor nodes and using GPU acceleration
programmed in CUDA. Experiments were conducted using the KDD99 dataset. The first setup used
a single node running an ensemble of NB, NN, and DT machine learning algorithms and resulted in
80-99.9% of accuracy of each attack category. The authors note that NN requiress significant training
time, so frequent retraining would likely be problematically time consuming. The second setup was
done with the use of a multi-node environment for parallelization with each node running a single
classifier: NB, NN, or DT. The second setup allows for a training time reduction for classifiers. The
anomaly detection accuracy of DT and NN is about the same, ranging from 69.10-99.88% for each
attack category and NB produced the poorest result ranging from 45.20-98.30%.
Harshaw et al. [61] introduce a novel graph-mining and robust statistics technique to detect multi-
scale (host and network level) anomalies. Self-harvested network flow data is used and a simple graph
is constructed for each 31s time window with 1 second overlap between consecutive windows. The
graphs’ vertices represent an IP, and directed edges represent network flows, with two edge colors
to encode port information. For network-level anomaly detection, small vertex-induced subgraphs,
called graphlets, are counted—this records how many small subgraphs make up the whole network flow
graph for each time window—and streaming anomaly detection is done on this sequence of vectors of
graphlet counts. Anomalies in this sequence indicate the network has some local topological changes.
For host-level detection, the host’s role in an incident graphlet is counted (automorphism orbits), and
anomalies in this sequence are flagged. The upshot of this method is that network-level anomalies can
be pinpointed to the hosts that changed communication patterns. To perform the anomaly detetion
on the sequence of vectors, a gaussian is fit using the Minimum Covariance Determinant method of
Rousseeuw & Driessen [141]—this robust fitting algorithm automatically omits h% of outliers and
fits the gaussian distribution to the remaining inlier—with the goal of preventing attacks and other
anomalies in the training (historical) data from affecting the models. Accurate detection of anomalous
bit torrent traffic and port scans (although non malicous) were exhibited.
Bridges et al. [15] focus on mathematical foundations for setting the threshold of probabilistic
anomaly detectors. Their method can be considered in two ways—either one can set the threshold to
bound the number of alerts (useful in high-throughput data situations to prevent flooding downstream
systems) or if the alert rate bound is broken that indicates the probability model is a poor fit to the
data. To exhibit the second alternative, Bridges et al. show that the robustly fit gaussians of Harshaw
et al. are overfit to the inliers, i.e., h = 15% is too high for this application.
Many of the literature reviews found in this survey discuss detailed techniques for improved feature
selection via reduction and construction. Additional feature selection algorithms for IDSs can be found
in the survey by Chen et al. [22].
De la Hoz et al. [30] use the NSGA-II algorithm of Deb et al. [32], a multi-objective (maximize
classification metrics while minimizing the number of features) feature selection algorithm with “an
unsupervised clustering procedure based on Growing Hierarchical Self-Organizing Maps” (GH-SOMs)
for both attack and anomaly detection. DARPA98 and NSL-KDD datasets used for evaluation. The
selected feature sets are computed and reach 99.12% accuracy while yielding normal and anomalous
traffic detection rates as high as 99.8% and 99.6%, respectively. Additionally, a reduction in the GH-
SOM size improves the computational efficiency, making it a viable option for performing additional
tasks (e.g., IP blocking) in real time.
As non-attack data quantities far outnumber attack quantities, class imbalance is a perennial
problem for machine learning intrusion detection algorithms. Zhu et al. [185] propose I-NSGA-III.
Their algorithm is an improvement of NSGA-III, another multi-objective feature selection algorithm
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of Deb et al. [31], to both alleviate redundant features and improve the accuracy in the face of
imbalanced classes. Building on De la Hoz et al. [30], they also use GH-SOM classifier for IDS and a
similar method for feature selection. The algorithm can identify the attacks and distinguish between
the different attack classes. The enhanced NSGA-III algorithm (I-NSGA-III) is compared to NSGA-II
and NSGA-III algorithms among other algorithms. All are evaluated with NSL-KDD, KDD99, and
GURE-KDD datasets.
Results indicate that I-NSGA-III algorithm requires the least training and testing time with the
best or near best detection rate.
Kim et al. [89] introduce a new hybrid IDS for detection of anomalies and misuses. Their method
is a combination of C4.5 DT and OCSVM methods. First, a DT is used for misuse detection and
partitioning data into smaller subsets. Then, multiple OCSVMs are applied to each subset for anomaly
detection. Using the NSL-KDD dataset for evaluation, results indicate that the proposed hybrid IDS
has higher detection rate by about 10%, while false positive rate is below 10%, and shows faster
training compared to other conventional methods. Training and testing time was 56.58s and 11.20s,
respectively.
Ravale et al. [138] create a hybrid learning approach by first applying k-means clustering, to reduce
the large heterogeneous dataset into multiple, smaller homogeneous subsets, and to select features.
Following this, a Radial SVM classifier is used with the selected features. Evaluation with the KDD99
dataset resulted in increased performance with greater rates of accuracy and detection, while achieving
a fewer false alarms than either SVM or k-means independently.
Eesa et al. [38] describe an IDS approach that minimizes the quantity of features utilized while
maximizing the detection rate. For feature-selection, a new cuttlefish optimization algorithm (CFA)
[37] is used as a search method to determine the ideal feature subset, and then a DT uses the CFA-
selected subset of features to perform classification. An experiment was conducted using the KDD99
dataset; this was processed eight times through the DT classifier with different subsets of of the CFA-
selected features, ranging from 5 to 41 features. The results reveal that the feature subsets containing
20 features or less, ascertained with CFA, provide greater rates of both detection and accuracy while
presenting fewer false alarms than results utilizing every feature.
Lin et al. [108] describe a feature representation method that combines Cluster Centers and Near-
est Neighbors (CANN). The CANN method converts original features into a single “distance-based
feature” that is fed to a k-NN classifier. This gives an initial computation cost for the dimension
reduction, but yields better performance in detection. Results on KDD99 data show that CANN
yields better accuracy, and true positive and false positive rate than either k-NN or SVM classifiers
with unmodified six features. CANN is, however, ineffective at both U2R and R2L attack detection.
Ikram & Cherukuri [71] describe a hybrid IDS with improved accuracy and lower resource con-
sumption, using principal component analysis (PCA) for initial dimension reduction followed by an
optimized SVM. The novelty of this proposed approach is optimization of an SVM punishment fac-
tor and RBF kernel’s gamma parameter using automatic parameter selection. To test this proposed
approach, NSL-KDD and GURE-KDD network traffic datasets were used. Detection accuracy for
NSL-KDD data is reported before and after applying PCA of each class—Probe, DoS, U2R, R2L
and Normal classes—from 85.65% to 90.84%, from 46.41% to 80.43%, from 33.33% to 78.35%, from
87.19% to 78.35% and from 97.38% to 63.62%, respectively.
We conclude this subsection with an introspective work on the flurry of algorithmic research
spawned by the KDD and DARPA datasets. Motivated by many machine learning algorithms achiev-
ing greater than 90% detection rates with less than 1% false positive rates using the KDD99 dataset
[135, 103, 40, 82], Kayacik et al. [83] conduct feature-relevance analysis to gain insight. The most
relevant features with respect to dataset’s labels are determined by employing information gain in
conjunction with DTs; therefore, the highest information gain determines the most discriminative
features, which makes classification easier. Due to the need for distinct features for information gain
calculation, continuous features are converted to discrete features by equally partitioning with the
equal frequency intervals method [173]. Three of the provided classes, “normal”, “smurf”, and “nep-
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tune”, are highly related to certain features and are comprised of 98% of the training data thus making
it easily classifiable for machine learning algorithms. While the quantity of data exchanged is the most
discriminating feature for 14 of the 23 classes, some features have no effect on intrusion detection,
indicating that they are not needed.
9 Conclusion
This survey provides an overview of IDS types including various locations and types of IDSs. Related
surveys are identified, and focus is given to HIDSs. In order to organize works and itemize the available
data sources, the HIDS literature is presented per input data source. In particular, system logs,
audit data, Windows Registry, file systems, and program analysis detection works are sub-categories
investigated. Specific sections are allocated for system call IDS and another for algorithmic research
tested on network-level data but applicable to host data. A large number of works fall into these two
categories because of the publicly available labeled datasets with these types of data. We conclude
with a subsection outlining limitations and budding directions for HIDS research. Additionally, this
survey compiles a supplementary list of many publicly available datasets, with descriptions of their
characteristics and shortcomings.
9.1 Suggested Future Directions
Although there is a wealth of IDS literature, successfully transitioned-to-practice HIDS techniques are
rare, with OCSEC and Tripwire as outstanding counter examples. This is due to a number of factors
that point to directions for future progress in HIDS research.
First, IDS research is constrained by limited available datasets and “in vitro” development (where
test environments fail to capture the complexities of real networks). For many data sources, there are
either no datasets publicly available, or those that are available are outdated, low-quality, lacking in
attack diversity, or contain other serious flaws. This leads to researchers often simulating or otherwise
building datasets that often lacks fidelity, complexity, or realistic benign activity. Alternatively, when
real data is recorded and used, it is generally not sharable due to privacy or security concerns, and
may still contain many of the limitations above (e.g. lack of attack diversity.) As evidenced by
the explosion of IDS research spawned by the few well-adopted datasets (DARPA, KDD, UNM,
ADFA, most notably), these facilitate quantifiable comparison of techniques across publications and
provide accessible data to the hands of eager researchers, in spite of their many flaws. Up-to-date
efforts to curate and publicize realistic, attack-labeled, and ideally multi-source host and network data
sets will likely be met with a similarly large response from the IDS research community. Moreover,
for supervised learning techniques, addressing the question of training for actual operational use is
a necessity, e.g., providing a validated method for generating training data that combines a real
host’s/network’s data with labeled attacks.
Second, HIDS research is preoccupied with (admittedly important) detection metrics at the ex-
pense of understandability of alerts. Indeed, for adoption of an HIDS, gaining the user’s trust in
terms adequate testing to establish an acceptable true-to-false positive balance is a necessity. On
the other hand, the myriad of publications that flex their statistical prowess and claim success upon
incriminating detection rates often fail to provide actionable results to the operator. This “semantic
gap” problem is perhaps first established by the famous Sommer & Paxson work [150]. Security in-
formation and event management (SIEM) tools, which correlate alerts and logs from diverse systems
in real-time to enhance operators understanding, are emerging in the commercially available tools,
and research providing open-source options also are developing, e.g., see Stucco13. Research is needed
to leverage the many diverse but related data sources available to an HIDS, (not only to increase
detection accuracy, but) to provide a contextual, situational awareness along with an accurate alert
is needed to operationalize much of the work surveyed here.
13 See https://github.com/stucco.
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We note that the new Unified Host and Network Data set of Turcotte et al. [164] contributes to
these first two directions by providing real network and host data for researchers. Further, efforts
such as Ilgun [72] provide an automated component to present the alerts to the user in a smart way.
Finally, while many researchers provide adequate investigations of the computational burden of
their IDS, this is a known inhibitor of HIDS deployment. Research to dynamically change the IDS
for dual optimization of increased security and decreased overhead is needed. Examples may include
dynamic algorithms to adjust detector alert thresholds, change computational requirements, adjust
data sources collected, or change the position or security posture of the host, based on current con-
ditions to provide a more effective tradeoff between resources and security. Some works have begun
these investigations, in particular, for cloud applications [101] and for threshold tuning [15].
Overall, we hope our treatment of the HIDS literature provides an organized panorama for re-
searchers to gain insights, identify opportunities, and more quickly progress in advancing HIDSs.
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Supplementary Section: Datasets
Intrusion detection evaluation datasets are important resources for validation, comparison, and experimenta-
tion. Popularity of a labeled dataset among researchers allows comparison of detection metrics or performance
across publications, and in many cases has stimulated a flurry of IDS research on a particular data source.
Common pitfalls of such datasets are artificial artifacts correlated with targets, unrealistic attacks, and redun-
dant or missing data among others. Here we have compiled the datasets commonly used in the HIDS research
literature with a brief description of their contents, and noteworthy advantages or drawbacks. Table 10 gives
itemized information at a glance, and the website for each data source is at the conclusion of its description
in the text.
Information Marketplace for Policy and Analysis of Cyber-Risk & Trust (IMPACT) The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security maintains the IMPACT database14. Formerly known as PREDICT, the “Pro-
tected Repository for the Defense of Infrastructure Against Cyber Threats”, IMPACT contains recent
network operations data contributions from developers around the world aiming to improve cyber-risk
research and development. The cyber-related dataset repository is publicly available.
Digital Corpora Computer forensics education research data including disk images, memory dumps, net-
work packet captures, etc., is available freely in this database. Additionally, Digital Corpora provides a
research corpus of real data acquired from around the world; however, usage is limited.
DARPA Intrusion Detection 1998, 1999, & 2000 The “Cyber Systems and Technology Group” of MIT
Lincoln Laboratory, working with DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and AFRL (Air
Force Research Laboratory), created the first public, standard corpora intended for evaluation of computer
network intrusion detection systems [99].
The 1998 dataset is a widely-used collection of known attacks, and consists of system call based audit data
and network data, including full packet capture. The data is comprised of praudit15 and list files, as
well as packet captures from tcpdump; The attacks conducted to generate this dataset were not automated,
and they are considered high footprint attacks by subsequent researchers. [59]
Numerous issues have been documented with this dataset [113, 112, 16]. Brugger and Chow [16] noted
several issues with the dataset including inability to accommodate the latest attack trends, and the majority
of malicious connections consisting of denial of service attacks and probing activity.
The 1999 dataset consists of a series of network packet dumps and BSM system call records. The data has
been widely used in the intrusion detection and networking community, even though it is known to have
a number of artifacts of its creation, including the lack of damaged or unusual background packets and
uniform host distribution. [112]
14 See https://www.impactcybertrust.org.
15 See https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19253-01/816-4557/auditref-76/index.html for description of the
praudit command.
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Table 10: Datasets and Public Datasets and Dataset Collections
Name/Abbreviation Data Source Attack Class Website
IMPACT NA Various http://www.impactcybertrust.org
Digital Corpora
Database
NA Various http://digitalcorpora.org
DARPA98, 99, 00 Network traf-
fic, System
calls
DOS, U2R, R2L,
PROBE
http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/communications/cyber/CSTcorpora/ideval/data
KDD99 Network traffic DOS, U2R, R2L,
PROBE
https://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
NSL-KDD Network traffic DOS, U2R, R2L,
PROBE
http://www.unb.ca/cic/research/datasets/nsl.html
GURE-KDD PCAPs DOS, U2R, R2L,
PROBE
http://aldapa.eus/res/gureKddcup
UNM System calls Buffer overflows,
symbolic link,
trojans
http://www.cs.unm.edu/˜immsec/systemcalls.htm
ADFA-LD, ADFA-
WD, ADFA-
WD:SAA
System calls Exfiltration, DDoS,
other
https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/australian-centre-for-cyber-security/cybersecurity/ADFA-IDS-Datasets
Active DNS Project DNS PCAPs Malware, spam,
phishing, other
https://www.activednsproject.org
SecRepo malware,
NIDS,
host logs,
PCAPs
Various http://www.secrepo.com
Malware Traffic
Analysis
Malware,
PCAPs
Malware http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net
NETRESEC PCAP DBs list Various http://www.netresec.com/?page=PCAPFiles
CTU 13 Network flow,
PCAPs
Botnet https://goo.gl/i9WQq3
Malware Capture
Facility Project
PCAPs Botnet, Various https://www.stratosphereips.org/datasets-malware
The Honeynet
Project
Malware,
PCAPs, logs
Various http://honeynet.org/challenges
VAST Challenge 2013 Network flows,
logs
DOS, FTP exfil.,
other
http://vacommunity.org/VAST+Challenge+2013
VAST Challenge 2012 Network logs Botnet, scanning,
exfil.
http://vacommunity.org/VAST+Challenge+2012
UNSW-NB15 PCAPs Fuzzers, backdoors,
DoS, exploits,
recon, other
https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/australian-centre-for-cyber-security/cybersecurity/ADFA-NB15-Datasets/
CAIDA PCAP headers,
other internet
data
Unlabeled http://www.caida.org/data
Unified Host and
Network Dataset
Network &
host audit data
Unlabeled https://csr.lanl.gov/data/2017.html
KDD Cup 1999 (KDD99) This dataset was created by processing the tcpdump16 portions of the DARPA98
dataset. It provides labeled data for intrusion detection and contains four attack types; DoS (denial of
service), U2R, R2L, and PROBE [129]. However, evaluating machine learning algorithms, such as DTs
[135, 103], NNs [82], and SVMs [40], with KDD99 substantiates that it is not possible to accurately detect
16 See https://danielmiessler.com/study/tcpdump/ for a tutorial on the tcpdump command/tool.
38
U2R and R2L attacks. Sabhnani & Serpen [143] investigated the KDD dataset deficiencies and concluded
that for the U2R and the R2L attack categories no trainable pattern classification or machine learning
algorithm can achieve an acceptable level of misuse detection performance on the KDD testing data subset
if classifier models are built using the KDD training data subset. This is due to the omission of attacks
and their records from the training data subset.
NSL-KDD The NSL-KDD dataset was created to improve upon the shortcomings of the KDD99 dataset.
KDD99s record redundancy hinders an algorithms ability to learn by causing a bias against infrequent
records and, in turn, overlooking harmful attacks. This issue was resolve with the removal of duplicate
records in both the training and testing sets. Consequently, the reduction makes it feasible to run the
experiments on the full set without requiring random subset selection. . [159]
GureKddcup and GureKddcup6percent GureKddcup consists of the KDD99 connections with added
network packet payload that allows for direct extraction by learning algorithms. The GureKDDcup dataset
is generated by following the same steps as the KDD99 dataset and consists of numerous redundant entries.
Bro-IDS is used for processing the tcpdump files to acquire connections along with their attributes. All
connections are labeled with MIT’s “connections-class” files [144]. The original dataset size is 9.3GB, and
the 6% dataset size is 4.2GB. [134]
University of New Mexico dataset (UNM) In 2004, the UNM dataset was released consisting of four
datasets of systems calls executed by active processes; “Synthetic Sendmail UNM, Synthetic Sendmail
CERT, live lpr UNM, and live lpr MIT” [39]. Several programs are included “(e.g., programs that run as
daemons and those that do not), programs that vary widely in their size and complexity, and different kinds
of intrusions (buffer overflows, symbolic link attacks, and Trojan programs). [127]. The dataset consists
of both “synthetic” and “live” traces, and a trace consists of a list of a unique process system calls. The
UNM dataset is as antiquated as the KDD data and focuses on individual processes rather than the entire
OS [27].
ADFA IDS datasets (ADFA-LD, ADFA-WD and ADFA-WD:SAA) Since performance on the Darpa98
and KDD99 datasets does not represent true performance against contemporary attacks, ADFA was de-
veloped as a modern benchmark for HID. The ADFA IDS labeled dataset is the successor of the KDD
collection using the latest publicly available exploits and methods. There are three groups of data with
raw system call traces: training, testing normal, and testing attack. The dataset is designed for use with
an anomaly based IDS so there are no attack traces used during training.
All training and validation data traces were gathered under normal host operations, during activities
varying from browsing the web to LATEXdocument generation. The ADFA dataset contains more similarities
between attack data and normal data than either the Darpa98 or the KDD99 datasets. This allows for a
more accurate portrayal of cyber attacks and better assessment of IDS performance. [27]
Two Windows OS specific datasets were generated to protect from zero-day attacks, stealth attacks, data
exfiltration, and DDoS attacks. ADFA-WD is comprised of known “Windows based vulnerability ori-
ented zero-day attacks” and ADFA-WD:SAA is an expansion used for resistance validation of prospective
HIDS. [57]
Active DNS Project Over a terabyte of “unprocessed DNS packet captures” (PCAPs) along with a plethora
of daily de-duplicated DNS records. [94].
Security Repo (SecRepo) The SecRepo is a compilation of Security data including malware, NIDS, Mod-
bus, and system logs. Additionally, it consists of several of the following datasets.
Malware Traffic Analysis Samples of malware binaries and PCAPs are provided along with an active
campaign listing. 17
NETRESEC Data This data is a list of public packet capture repositories, which are freely available on the
Internet. Most of the sites listed below share Full Packet Capture (FPC) files, but some do unfortunately
only have truncated frames. This includes SCADA/ICS Network Captures.
CTU 13 The data contains 13 datasets 18, each containing a malware binary, a network flow .csv file from
the ARGUS flow sensor 19, and PCAP file(s) with botnet traffic. Included in every dataset is a readme
file providing information for which IPs are infected or attacked and how. [47]
17 See http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2018/index.html.
18 See https://mcfp.weebly.com/the-ctu-13-dataset-a-labeled-dataset-with-botnet-normal-and-background-traffic.html
19 See http://qosient.com/argus.
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Malware Capture Facility Project This dataset is an extension of the CTU 13 dataset, and consists of
the similar information from around 350 attacks pertaining to malicious PCAPs.
The Honeynet Project Consists of a variety of data from all of the challenges, including PCAP, malware,
and logs.
VAST Challenge 2013 Mini-Challenge 3 This is a cybersecurity challenge that includes data related to
network flow, network status, and intrusion prevention systems. However, there are sizable data gaps.
VAST Challenge 2012 This challenge consists of two smaller tasks. The first involving situational aware-
ness (e.g., metadata and periodic status reporting) and the second involving forensics (e.g., Firewall and
IDS logs).
UNSW-NB15 A comprehensive dataset for NIDS containing nine attacks types: Fuzzers, Analysis, Back-
doors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode, and Worms. The ARGUS flow sensor and
Bro-IDS20 tools are used along with the development of twelve algorithms for the generation of 49 features
with the class label.
Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) The CAIDA Anonymized Internet Traces 2016
annual dataset consists of anonymized traffic traces with a single trace generated quarterly. The internet
traffic contains “application breakdown, security events, topological distribution, and flow volume and
duration.” Software capable of reading packet captures (PCAPs) in tcpdump format can read the traces.
All traces are made anonymous with the same key using “CryptoPan prefix-preserving anonymization and
there is a complete packet payload removal. There is a negligible quantity of packet lost for some data. [126]
Unified Host and Network Dataset The “Unified Host and Network Dataset” consists of both network
and host event data gathered from Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL) over approximated ninety
days. The host event logs come from Microsoft Windows OS machines and the network event data comes
from “router network flow records.” Although there is overlap in the Windows OS machines use for both the
network and host datasets, the network dataset also utilizes additional machines running other OSs. [164]
9.2 Common Attack Types in Publicly Available Datasets
Table 11: DARPA Attack
Classes
Attack Class Class Name
0 Normal
1 Probe
2 DoS
Compromises
3 U2R
4 R2L
The records in the DARPA- and KDD-related datasets include attack types
and can be classified into one of five classes: Probe, DoS, U2R, R2L, and
Normal.
Many papers included in this survey refer to the traditional attack
classes by the numbering convention provided in Table 11. The table and
definitions provided below can be used as a quick reference.
The last two classes are considered compromises and occur when an
attacker gains privileged access to host access after hacking into the sys-
tem through insecure points. Compromises are separated into two classes
depending based on the source of the attack.
1. Probing (surveillance, scanning): Attacker tries to gain information about the target host, e.g., port scan-
ning. These attacks collect lists of potential vulnerabilities through network scans that can be utilized later
in an attack against the machine or service.
2. Denial of Service (DoS): Attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from using a service, e.g., using SYN
flood. These attacks an occur on both the operation system; targeting bugs, or in the network; exploiting
protocols and infrastructure limitations.
3. User to Root (U2R): The attack is derived from within the system. An attacker who has local access to
the victim machine tries to gain root access by exploiting a vulnerability, e.g., local buffer overflow attacks.
4. Remote to Local (R2L): The attack is derived from outside the system, over the network. The attacker
does not have access to any legitimate account on the victim machine, therefore tries to gain access. This is
commonly achieved through the Internet using password guessing attacks or exploits allowing remote code
execution.
20 See https://www.bro.org/sphinx/broids/index.html.
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